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Measuring Effective Tax Rates on Human Capital: The Canadian Case
Kirk A. Collins and James B. Davies

Abstract
This paper analyzes the impacts of a wide range of tax provisions on the incentive
to invest in human capital, and shows how these effects can be quantified using effective
tax rates, or ETRs. The approach is illustrated using data for Canada. For individuals
with median earnings, ETRs on the human capital formed in first-degree university study
are sizeable, although not as large as for physical capital in Canada. When the
expenditure side and its direct subsidies are also taken into account, the net effective tax
rate on human capital becomes negative. The taxation of human capital is far from
uniform. ETRs vary by income level, gender, part-time vs. full-time study, whether
students have loans, number of dependants, and use of sheltered savings plans. Workers
at higher percentile levels of the earnings distribution throughout life may face ETRs
substantially higher than those for low- income workers, as a result of progressive income
taxation.

I. Introduction

Over the last two decades there has been a considerable amount of research on the
effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) on physical capital. It has been found that these
EMTRs are generally high, and that they vary across types of firms, industries, and types
of capital. (See Beach et al., 1984; King and Fullerton, 1984; and McKenzie et al.,
1998.) While the size of the impact on investment and its composition is an important
question that cannot be addressed simply by estimating EMTRs, these findings have
helped to create concern about such impacts. This has added impetus to the movement to
reduce capital taxation and to make it more uniform.
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While there has also been considerable interest in recent years in the tax treatment
of education and training1 , we do not have estimates of the effective tax rates on human
capital. This is a problem since some features of the tax system, e.g. progressivity, tend
to discourage human capital formation, while others, e.g. deductions or credits to support
education, have the opposite effect. We do not know the net impact, and therefore do not
know whether the tax system encourages or discourages human capital; how it treats
human capital compared with physical capital; or how effective tax rates on human
capital vary across the population.

This paper is a first attempt to provide the missing information on human capital
effective tax rates (ETRs). It first provides a conceptual framework for measuring these
ETRs, analyzing how the progressivity of personal income taxes interacts with other PIT
features, other taxes, and student loan plans. It then provides estimates for the ETRs on
human capital formed in first degree university studies in Canada. 2 We find that these are
sizeable although not as large as effective tax rates on physical capital, and that they vary
considerably across individuals. ETRs on human capital in Canada are, on average,
greater for males than for females, and increase as we go up the income scale. ETRs are
lower for individuals who take out student loans, and for those who take advantage of
Registered Education Savings Plans (RESP’s). There are also differences in ETRs
created by a number of other tax features. The conclusion is thus that Canada has far
from uniform tax treatment of human capital.

In assessing fiscal incentives or disincentives for human capital investment it is
essential to take into account the great encouragement that governments provide for such
investment, on their expenditure side. For a more complete treatment one therefore needs
to consider the effective subsidy rate, ESR, as well as the ETR. 3 The "bottom line" is

1

See e.g. Dupor et al., 1996; Kaplow, 1996; and Heckman et al., 1999.
It would of course be interesting to study ETRs on other levels of education, as discussed briefly in the
conclusion. These would include the ETR on incomplete university education. Estimation of these other
ETRs is beyond the scope of the present study.
3
Note that tax and expenditure systems may have effects on human capital investment apart from those via
tax and subsidy rates. For example, if students are liquidity constrained, taxes that are incurred more after
graduation - - e.g. income and payroll taxes - - will encourage human capital investment compared with e.g.
2
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given by the net effective tax rate, ETR - ESR. As we show, this net tax rate is on average
negative, and once again highly non-uniform.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a
description of the conceptual framework adopted. In Section III we examine the
treatment of human capital under the Canadian tax system. Finally, Section IV presents
our numerical results, and Section V concludes.

II. Conceptual Framework

How can one tell whether a tax system provides a net incentive or disincentive for
investment? This problem has been analyzed by previous authors for the case of
physical capital. Structures, equipment, and inventories are taxed in different ways, and
there are also differences across industries and according to how investment is financed.
In order to summarize these effects and see how they net out, it has proven fruitful to
calculate hypothetical effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) by type of capital, industry,
and method of finance. (See, e.g., Boadway et al., 1984; King and Fullerton, 1984, and
McKenzie et al. 1998.)

As mentioned in the Introduction, EMTR’s on physical capital are high and nonuniform. Looking only at non-personal taxes, McKenzie et al. (1998), for example, find
that EMTRs in Canada in 1997 averaged 29.0% on inventories, 19.0% on machinery,
18.9% on structures, and 15.6% on land. The overall average EMTR was 21.8%. Rates
within industries ranged from 8.5% in agriculture, fishing and trapping, to 29.5% for
public utilities. Largely due to their lower rate of corporate income tax, small firms on
average faced an EMTR of only 13.3% while large firms paid 27.0%.

Personal taxation of capital income is also significant and highly non-uniform.
Poddar and English (1999) estimate that about 75% of investment income is tax- free at
consumption taxes. Future research may allow us to take these other aspects into account, and also to
investigate the quantitative impact of ETRs e.g. on students’ propensity to obtain university education.
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the personal level in Canada - - due to various tax shelters (e.g. RRSPs and RPPs) and
other factors such as the non-taxation of imputed rent on owner-occupied housing. On
the other hand, tax rates on the interest, dividends, and capital gains that are not sheltered
can be quite high. There are no estimates of personal- level EMTRs on capital income for
Canada. However, most investors would have paid tax on taxable elements of investment
income at top marginal rates, which averaged about 46% in Canada in 1997, including
provincial taxes. Applying the Poddar and English result, the average personal EMTR on
investment income may then have been about 10%. Added to the McKenzie et al. figure,
this suggests an average total (personal plus non-personal) EMTR on physical capital of
at least 30%.

While the problem of measuring effective tax rates on human capital is formally
the same as that for physical capital, there are measurement issues that make a different
approach necessary in practice for human capital. 4 In the case of physical capital one can
make plausible assumptions about the rate of return to a hypothetical marginal investment
based on observed asset returns in capital markets. For human capital rates of return are
not directly observable. For physical capital the fact that real-world investments are
typically lumpy does not affect the results. Corporate taxes are levied at a flat rate, so the
estimated effective tax rate does not depend on the size of the investment. For human
capital the most important tax is the personal income tax, whose graduated rate structure
makes the effective tax rate depend on the scale of the investment.

For human capital rates of return can be estimated using microdata on education
and earnings over the lifetime. Tax treatment depends on individual circumstances and
requires a comparison of the taxes that would be paid in the counterfactual, i.e. without
additional educatio n, vs. those paid if extra schooling is obtained. The most meaningful
4

The problems faced when dealing with human capital are quite different than in the study of physical
capital. For example, in calculating EMTR's for physical capital one must specify a scenario concerning the
determination of market rates of return. It might be assumed, for example, that Canada is a small player in
a perfectly competitive world capital market. In order to pay the world interest rate, a corporation would
have to earn a gross rate of return on a debt-financed project sufficient to pay both tax and interest at the
world rate. By observing market rates and tax parameters one can infer the before-tax rate of return on a
marginal investment. The after-tax return is then found by deducting all taxes. As we shall see, the
procedure for human capital is quite different.
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calculation compares the before- and after-tax rates of return to participation in a
complete education program, whether it be e.g. community college, undergraduate
university study, M.A. or Ph.D. work. Thus it is not really marginal effective tax rates
that we are interested in, but effective tax rates (ETRs) for specific education or training
programs. 5

The ETR for human capital is defined as the gap between gross- and net-of-tax
rates of return to a whole program of study, rg and rn , respectively:

(1)

ETR =

rg − rn
r
=1- n
rg
rg

This definition, which is built on the use of internal rates of return, follows the
methodology applied in computing ETRs on personal financial assets by Davies and
Glenday (1990). 6

Suppose that an individual aged t is planning to engage in a program of education
that will take m years of study. We will assume that after this program is completed the
individual will stay in the labor force until age T. Students may continue to earn while
going to school. Their wage rates can vary over time, perhaps increasing while they are
still in school, and likely rising in real terms over much of the lifetime after graduation.
Actual earnings before-tax are given by Et , which is the product of the wage rate and
hours worked. Earnings before-tax in the absence of the educational program would have
been E t∗ , where we assume that E t∗ < Et in the T - m years after graduation. Forgone
earnings costs of education, FEt, are thus E t∗ − E t in the first m years. In addition to
these costs, there are private direct costs of education, Ct . After-tax variables will be
5

The situation for on-the-job training is different. (This is one of the reasons that we do not deal with OJT
in this paper. It would require a separate study.) One can imagine OJT being provided in quite small units,
and the sensitivity of results to the size of the investment becomes less of a problem. This is because the
relevant tax on the employer’s side, i.e. the corporate tax, is levied at a flat rate, and provided investments
are not too large individuals’ marginal tax rates will also not be strongly affected by OJT.
6
An alternative is to define the ETR as the ratio of the present value of net taxes on labour income over the
lifetime to the present value of lifetime earnings. (See Mintz, 2001.) While the two approaches will often
produce similar results, this is not always the case. We prefer the approach followed here in part because it
does not require any assumption to be made about individuals' discount rates.
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denoted E ta , E ta ∗ , FE ta , and Cta . Initially we will assume that human capital
investments are self- financed, that is that student loans are absent.
Rates of return on the investment described are calculated as internal rates
of return. For example, we can compute the gross private rate of return, rg , from:
T

(2)

E − Ct

∑ (1 + r )
t =1

g

t −1

Et*
.
t −1
t =1 (1 + rg )
T

=∑

By replacing Et , E t∗ , and Ct with the after-tax variables E ta , E ta ∗ , and Cta , we could
compute the net after-tax rate of return, rn , using this same equation. Note that in the
case of a flat tax with tuition and other direct costs of education deductible rn = rg , and
ETR = 0. This is because with such a tax levied at the rate, say, τ, we have
E ta = (1 − τ ) E t , E ta ∗ = (1 − τ ) E t∗ , and Cta = (1 − τ ) Ct . That is, the three variables have
the same relative values after- as before-tax. We shall refer to this type of tax system as
neutral with respect to human capital. 7 It imposes a zero ETR because the forgone
earnings and direct costs of education are implicitly subsidized at the same rate, τ, at
which the gains from education are taxed.

Note that “neutrality” is used here in a special, and very limited, sense. It is
simply a benchmark. There is no implication that a zero ETR on human capital is the
optimal rate. Externalities of human capital, or capital market imperfections that make it
difficult for students to finance their studies, could call for a negative ETR. Absent such
factors, a non-zero ETR could be needed in the second-best solution if there were a
positive EMTR on physical capital. In that case, while a low ETR would avoid
depressing investment it would also tilt the playing field away from physical capital
investment, causing a distortion in the composition of investment. Clearly, optimal

7

Note that "neutral" is used here in a special sense. We do not imply, e.g., that a tax system that is neutral
with respect to human capital is non-distortionary in its treatment of human vs. physical capital. That
depends on the effective tax rate on physical capital, and also on whether there are any relevant non-tax
distortions (e.g. capital market imperfections).
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design of the tax treatment of human capital is contingent on any constraints (political or
otherwise) on the tax treatment of physical capital.

By replacing private costs with public costs, Ctp , we can use (2) to compute the
public rate of return, rp . Given rp we can define the effective subsidy rate (ESR) on
human capital:

(3)

ESR =

rg − rp
rg

.

Whether the tax and expenditure systems combined have an incentive or disincentive
effect on human capital investment can be investigated by computing the net effective tax
rate on human capital, ETR – ESR. We proceed here by first analyzing the behaviour of
ETRs, and returning to ESRs at the end of the section.

The behaviour of ETRs can best be illuminated if we assume, for the sake of
illustration, that the length of the schooling program, m, is just one year. Rearrange (2)
so all the t = 1 terms are on one side and the remaining terms on the other:

Et − Et*
t −1
t = 2 (1 + rg )
T

(4)

E1* − E1+C1 = ∑

The left- hand side of (4) represents the private costs of the education program, made up
of foregone earnings, E1* − E1 , and direct costs, C1 . The right- hand side is the present
value of future earning increments due to education, Et − Et* .

Again for the sake of illustration, suppose that the yearly benefits of additional
education, Et − Et* − Ct , are constant. Then because T is typically large we have:
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Es* − Es + C ≈

Ew − Ew*
rg

where we use subscripts s and w to denote the schooling and working periods. We now
have a simple expression for the before-tax rate of return rg and a parallel expression for
the after-tax rate of return, rn :
Ew − Ew∗
EI
=
∗
Es − Es + C FE + C

(i)

rg ≈

( ii )

Ewa − Ewa*
(1 − τ w ) EI
rn ≈ a*
a
a =
Es − Es + C
(1 − τ s ) FE + C a

(5)

where FE is forgone earnings and EI is the "earnings increment" achieved due to the
extra education. Both FE and EI are before-tax. The tax rates Js and Jw represent the
fraction of FE that would have been paid in tax, and the fraction of EI that is paid,
respectively.

If we ignore direct costs for the time being we have:
(i)

rg

C =0

=

EI
FE

(ii)

rn

C=0

=

(1 − τ w ) EI
(1 − τ s ) FE

(6)

Applying (1) the effective tax rate on human capital in this case is:

(7)

ETR C =0 =

rg − rn
rg

=

τw −τs
1− τ s

This simple expression has some interesting implications. It indicates that, in the absence
of direct costs, the effective tax rate on human capital is directly related to the gap
between Js and Jw. The most obvious possibility is that the graduated rates under personal
income tax will make Js < Jw, resulting in a positive ETR. The gap between Js and Jw
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will tend to be largest for those education programs that have the biggest impact on
earnings. This is one reason that first-degree university education is of particular interest.
Not only is it a very important element in our education system, but it is well-known to
increase earnings substantially. In contrast, incomplete university education, or graduate
education, have smaller effects on earnings, which will result in a smaller gap between Js
and Jw. Equation (7) gives reason to expect smaller ETR’s in these cases.

Of course othe r taxes also affect the ETR. Since social security and
unemployment insurance contributions are capped at maximum insurable earnings, their
schedules are regressive. To the extent that contributions represent pure taxes (i.e. not
offset by expected benefits), these schemes work towards Js > Jw for workers whose EI’s
fall entirely or partly above maximum insurable earnings. It should also be borne in mind
that sales taxes reduce real earnings. In the absence of any other taxes, proportional sales
taxes on a comprehensive base would give Js = Jw , that is neutrality. However, some
necessities are widely exempt from sales tax in North America and elsewhere (food,
children’s clothing etc.) or taxed at a lower rate, which reinforces the tendency for Js <
Jw, and a positive ETR.
Expressions (6) and (7) also make possible a number of other insights. We note
that:
Result 1: If Js < Jw, equal absolute or equal proportional increases in Js and Jw will
reduce rn *C=0 and increase ETR*C=0 .
This result hinges on the fact that with Js < Jw, we have (1 - Js) > (1 - Jw). Equal absolute
or proportional changes in Js and Jw have a greater proportional impact on
(1 - Jw) than on (1 - Js). The effect is of course stronger in the case of equal proportional
changes in the tax rates.

Result 1 is of interest when more than one tax is levied. Consider the impact of
adding alternative taxes to a pre-existing progressive federal income tax. Suppose that
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provincial income taxes were proportional to federal, as was approximately the case for
most provinces until recently. Provincial PIT would raise Js and Jw equi-proportionally.
While one might suppose that if provincial PIT were proportional to federal it would not
make the overall tax system more or less neutral with respect to human capital, Result 1
says that it would in fact raise the ETR on human capital. What is more, if the provincial
PIT were flat, so that it added an equal absolute amount to Js and Jw , it still would raise
the ETR by Result 1.

Another interesting application concerns sales taxes, which are an important
source of revenue in Canada. Above we saw that, in isolation, a uniform ad valorem
sales tax would be neutral with respect to human capital. However, with pre-existing
federal PIT, introducing such a sales tax raisesJs and Jw by equal absolute amounts, and
increases the ETR by Result 1. Exempting necessities from sales tax tends to offset this
effect, but it will not reverse it unless the sale tax is sufficiently more progressive than the
PIT - - a condition unlikely to be satisfied in practice.
Moving to the more general case, we need to take into account tuition and other
direct costs; the student loan amount, L; student loan repayments, iL, where i is the
interest rate; the rate of tax relief on student loan payments, d; and credits for tuition and
other expenses, A. Making the appropriate adjustments to the costs and returns we have:

(8)

ETR = 1 −

 (1 − τ w ) EI − i (1 − d ) L   FE + C − L 
rn
= 1− 
 

rg
 (1 − τ s ) FE + ( C − L − A)   EI − iL 

From (8) we have immediately:
Result 2: Increases in tuition credits, A, or in interest deductibility, d, unambiguously
reduce the ETR.

Note also from (8) that the ETR is affected by several non-tax policy variables,
e.g. tuition fees, student loan amounts, and interest rates on student loans. These
interaction effects are perhaps unexpected, and therefore particularly interesting. It
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should be emphasized that they are independent of the impact of these non-tax variables
on the effective subsidy rate on education. We summarize these effects in Results 3 and
4. (Proofs are available in an appendix that may be obtained from the authors.)

Result 3: A rise in tuition and other direct costs, C, raises the ETR.

The intuition for this result is that if C rises, with education credits A constant, the
implicit rate of subsidy to direct costs of education in the tax system has fallen. The
result is of topical interest in Canada and other countries, like the U.S., where tuition fees
have been rising rapidly in recent years. In the absence of offsetting action in the tax
system, such increases raise the tax distortion affecting human capital. Rising tuition fees
may also reflect a reduced rate of public subsidy to colleges and universities, meaning
that the ESR has been falling. Thus the net effective tax rate on human capital, ETR –
ESR tends to rise a fortiori.

In the next section we set out the many steps that have been taken at the federal
level in Canada in recent years to ease the tax treatment of human capital. These
initiatives will have acted to offset the rise in ETRs caused by increasing tuition fees and
other direct costs.

The following result reflects the leverage effect of student loans:

Result 4: If the after-tax interest rate on student loans, i(1-d), is less than the gross and
net rates of return on human capital, raising the loan amount, L, will increase both rn and
rg . The effect on the ETR depends on d. The ETR will rise or fall with L as d is less than
or greater than the ETR. 8

It is plausible that i(1-d) is less than both rn and rg ,since empirical estimates of
the private real rate of return to education are typically in the range of 7 – 10%. This is
8

If d is small, the effect of raising L on rn is smaller than the impact on rg . This is because the strength of
the leverage effect for rn depends on the gap between rn and i(1-d) whereas for rg it is the gap between rg
and i that matters.
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greater than the typical real rate of interest on student loans. Thus rn and rg are likely to
rise with L. What is the effect on the ETR? Student loan interest is credited at a federal
rate of 17%, and therefore a federal plus provincial rate of about 26%. The latter figure is
greater than almost all the ETRs we compute in the next section. Thus, a fall in the ETR
as L rises is the leading case. This is reinforced by the fact that our two-period setting
does not capture the fact that student loans are interest free during the schooling period.
This implies an increased subsidy during schooling when L rises that is akin to a rise in A.
Overall, rising student loan amounts will lead to a fall in ETR, an increase in ESR and a
drop in the net effective tax rate, ETR – ESR.

We should say a few words about the effective subsidy rate, ESR, which was defined
in (3). Note that the ESR depends only on rg and rp . It is thus independent of any aspects
of the tax system (in a partial equilibrium framework). It can, however, be affected by
the presence of student loans, since as we saw in (8) these affect rg . (Student loans have
no effect on rp , however. 9
Let σ = 1 - C/C p be the rate of subsidy on the direct costs of education. Then, in
the absence of student loans, the wedge between rg and rp , and therefore the ESR, will be
greater the larger σ or Cp , as we can see from:

(9)

ESR*L=0 = σ [Cp /(FE + Cp )]

Introducing student loans will raise rg if the student loan interest rate is less than rg
(which is plausible). This is likely to raise rg relative to rp and increase the ESR.
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III. Treatment of Human Capital under Canadian Tax and Student Loan Systems

The calculations in the next section incorporate the effects of both the personal
income tax system (federal and provincial) and payroll taxes (CPP/QPP and EI), as they
applied after the federal budget of 1998, which made a number of important changes in
the tax treatment of education. 10 Here we describe the relevant features of the PIT and
payroll tax systems, noting the reforms introduced in 1998 (as well as changes leading up
to those reforms) and deve lopments since. We also describe the student loan system as it
existed in 1998, and note more recent changes.

Personal Income Tax

A useful benchmark for describing how PIT impinges on human capital is a flat
tax system under which direct costs of education or training are fully deductible. Interest
on student loans would not be deductible. Under such a neutral system, ETR = 0.
Canadian PIT departs from neutrality by levying graduated marginal tax rates, in its
treatment of direct costs, and (since 1998) by allowing a credit for interest on student
loans.

Both federal and provincial PIT are levied on individuals, unlike the U.S. where
most married couples are taxed jointly. In 1998, basic federal marginal rates of 17%, 26
% and 29% were levied on taxable income in the ranges 0 - $29,590, $29,591 - $59,180,
and $59,181+. (These rates and brackets were in force from 1993 to 1999.) Adding in
surtaxes and provincial income tax, the full marginal rates in the three brackets came to
about 26, 40, and 46% in 1998 (Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999, Table 3.5). Important
deductions made in arriving at taxable income included those for Registered Retirement
9

The public rate of return is similar to the social rate of return. (The only difference is that the public rate
of return omits external costs or benefits of education.) From a social viewpoint, whether students take out
loans or not has no effect on the costs of, or returns to, education.
10
In a more comprehensive investigation some other taxes would also be taken into account. In the
previous section we remarked on the impact of sales taxes. In addition, corporate income taxes have
impacts on human capital formed via on-the-job training. See Collins and Davies (2002).
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Savings Plan (RRSP) and Registered Pension Plan (RPP) contributions and child care
expenses. Rather than providing personal allowances or exemptions as in most other
countries, a system of personal credits was applied. These gave all taxpayers the same
relief as if they had received personal deductions but were in the 17% marginal tax
bracket. On that basis, the credits given were equivalent to deductions of $6,456 for the
taxpayer and $5,380 for a dependent spouse or child over 18.

Refundable tax credits for children under 18 were provided via the Canada Child
Tax Benefit (CCTB) and the National Child Benefit Supplement (NCBS). The latter
were clawed back on family net incomes above $25,921 and $20,921 respectively. These
programs have little impact on costs of education, since relatively few students have
children, but they increase marginal tax rates for many graduates, and will therefore drive
up the ETR on human capital somewhat. 11

The tax relief on tuition and other direct expenses provided by the PIT comes in
the form of various credits, not as a deduction. In 1998 a credit was given for 17% of
tuition and additional mandatory fees paid to approved post-secondary institutions. A
further credit equal to 17% of an "education amount" was provided. The education
amount was $80 per month prior to 1996, but was raised in steps to $200 per month by
1998. Since most students have low incomes, these credits would in many cases not be
very valuable if they were only available to reduce the student's own tax liability. Their
value is enhanced by the fact that any unused portion can be transferred to a spouse,
parent or grandparent. 12 Also, in 1997 a carryforward provision for unused education
credits was introduced that would allow students to obtain tax relief themselves in later
years. These measures ensure that the effective implicit federal subsidy on direct costs

11

The NCBS was clawed back at rates ranging from 12.1% for one-child families to 26.8% for a family
with three or more children. This means that the credit was already clawed back completely for most
families at net income of $25,921, where the CCTB clawback kicked in at rates from 2.5% to 5.0%. The
latter relatively low rates mean that the CCTB clawback range is very wide. The clawback affects families
with incomes up to $67,000 - $75,000. However, since the CCTB clawback rates are relatively low, their
impact on human capital ETRs would be fairly small.
12
That is, up to a limit of $5,000 minus the part of the credit used by the student to reduce his/her tax
liability to zero.
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of education via PIT is close to being uniform at a 17% rate. Adding in provincial tax,
the average rate of relief is about 26%.

Note that the "education amount" credits are not related to actual expenditures,
but are simply paid as a lump sum. They are thus similar to a system of student grants.
This form of assistance would not have a tax-side rationale under a flat tax, but with
progressivity might be advocated as a rough offset to the effect of graduated marginal tax
rates on human capital ETRs.

The PIT system also provides assistance for education and training via registered
savings plans. First, Canadians are able to withdraw funds from their RRSP's without
penalty two years after contributions are made. This means that, assuming contribution
limits are not binding, parents could save for their children’s post-secondary education
via their RRSP's. While this avenue is no doubt sometimes chosen, it is not as attractive
as it might be since RRSP contribution limits have been held at relatively low levels. 13
Also, withdrawals are taxed. Parents will typically be in their peak earning years when
their kids go to college, and will therefore face high tax rates on withdrawals. This will
also make the RRSP saving route less attractive.
Parents are encouraged to save for their kids’ education via Registered Education
Saving Plans (RESP's). In contrast to an RRSP, contributions to an RESP are not tax
deductible. However, income earned within the plan is tax free, and if the proceeds are
spent on the child’s education withdrawals of accrued income enter the child’s income for
tax purposes. Given that post-secondary students are generally in low tax brackets, the
result is that the net of tax rate of return on RESP saving generally exceeds that on nonsheltered saving. 14 While RESP's provide a higher rate of return than on non-sheltered
saving, in the pre-1998 regime they were not sufficiently attractive to induce much use.
13

The current contribution limit for RRSPs plus Registered Pension Plans is the lesser of $13,500 or 18%
of earnings per year. The dollar limit is slated to rise to $14,500 in 2004 and to $15,500 in 2005, after
which it will be indexed to the average industrial wage. These levels represent a significant retreat,
however, from those promised by earlier federal budgets. The 1984 and 1985 budgets promised a limit of
$15,500 by 1990, with subsequent indexation.
14
Since withdrawals are generally taxed at a low rate, RESP’s approximate Roth IRA plans in the U.S.,
which have non-deductible contributions and tax-free withdrawals. Greater use of this type of sheltered
saving has been urged for Canada by e.g. Kesselman and Poschmann (2001).
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This may have been due to the opportunities for fully sheltered saving (e.g. via RRSPs) or
because a higher rate of return could be achieved by paying down mortgages and
consumer debt. 15

The 1996, 1997 and (especially) 1998 federal budgets introduced a number of
changes intended to reduce burdens on post-secondary students and to stimulate
education and training in Canada. The following were the principal changes:

1. The 1996 and 1997 budgets announced that the education amount would be raised
from its original $80 per month to $150 per month in 1997 and $200 per month in 1998.
2. The education amount was extended to part-time post-secondary students in the
1998 budget, at $60 per month. Part-time students also became eligible to claim child
care expense deduction (CCED) for the first time, up to $2,200 per year.
3. Canada Study Grants (CSG’s) of up to $3,000 per year were created in the 1998
budget for both full- and part-time students in financial need who had children or other
dependants.
4. Interest on student loans became eligible for a tax credit at the 17% rate in the 1998
budget.
5. Tax- free withdrawals of up to $10,000 per year ($20,000 in total) from RRSPs
were introduced in the 1998 budget to finance full- time training or education (or parttime for disabled people). These withdrawals must be repaid within 10 years.
6. The 1996 and 1997 budgets raised the annual contribution limits on RESPs from
$1,500 to $4,000 per student, and also increased the lifetime limit on contributions from
$31,500 to $42,000. The 1998 budget introduced Canada Ed ucation Saving Grants
(CESGs) equal to 20% of RESP contributions up to a limit of a $400 annual grant per
student. CESG amounts become part of the RESP. The 1998 budget also made it
possible to transfer an RESP balance to an RRSP if the student did not go on to
qualifying study after leaving high school.

15

In Canada interest on mortgages and consumer debt is not tax deductible. This makes paying down these
forms of debt a popular form of saving for those in the age range of about 25 – 45.
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All of these provisions act to increase the net-of-tax expected return to planned or
actual human capital investment for some taxpayers. 16 Note, however, that the incidence
of the increased returns varies greatly. Increased education amounts raise rn for almost all
students. On the other hand, interest credits only benefit those with student loans, and the
RESP/RRSP provisions have similarly limited incidence. Note also that the value of the
RESP/RRSP measures will vary substantially even among those who make use of these
savings plans. CESG's are proportional to RESP contributions; the benefit of RESP
saving depends on how attractive is the after-tax rate of return on the next-best saving
vehicle; the value of the option to rollover unused RESP funds into an RRSP depends on
how likely it is that education plans will fall through; and the benefit of being able to take
money out of an RRSP temporarily to finance education depends on the size of the tax
rate thereby avoided.

While we find in the next section that the provision of a partial credit for interest
on student loans does not have a large impact on rn 's or ETRs, the introduction of this
benefit in the Canadian PIT is an important precedent. Unlike many other countries
(including the U.S.), prior to 1998 Canada allowed no deductions or credits for interest on
student loans, consumer debt, or mortgage debt. It will be interesting to see if the
precedent on student loans paves the way for tax relief on these other forms of interest
payment.

Since 1998 the most important PIT changes affecting human capital have been (i)
a doubling of the education amounts in the 2001 tax year (to $400 and $120 per month
for full- time and part-time students respectively), (ii) reductions in federal tax rates and
changes in the rate structure, and (iii) the freeing- up of provincial PIT rate structures. 17
By the 2001 tax year the federal government had moved from its sharply graduated three
16

The RESP and RRSP provisions might be seen as raising the rate of return to financial assets. However,
the benefits in question are only realized as a result of planned or actual human capital investment. They
are therefore regarded here as increasing the net expected return on human capital.
17
A further change that could have a significant effect on human capital ETR’s in the long-run was the reindexation of federal brackets, credits and deductions announced in the February 2000 budget. Lack of
indexation erodes the progressivity of the tax system over time, as more and more taxpayers’ rising nominal
incomes push them into the top tax brackets. This may create a tendency for human capital ETR’s to fall
over time in a non-indexed system.
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bracket rate structure to more gradual progressivity. Federal rates were applied at the
rates of 16, 22, 26, and 29% on taxable income in the ranges 0 - $30,754, $30,755 $61,509, $61,510 - $100,000, and $100,000+. All federal surtaxes had been removed.
Including provincial taxes, full marginal rates in the four brackets were 24%, 33%, 40%,
and 44%. The reduced progressivity should reduce human capital ETR’s somewhat.

Prior to the 2001 tax year all nine provinces that were signatories to the federalprovincial tax collection agreements were bound to levy their basic PIT as a flat % of the
basic federal tax. Quebec levied and collected its own separate PIT. Under this
arrangement, federal surtaxes did not affect provincial PIT, and the provinces were free to
enact their own surtaxes and credits additional to those provided by Ottawa. While in the
1970s and 80s provincial PIT payments could broadly be thought of as proportional to
federal, by 1998 this approximation was becoming strained. Some provinces, notably
Ontario, levied surtaxes, and a wide range of provincial credits were provided, e.g. for
provincial political contributions, qualifying investments, property and sales taxes, and
dependent children. Finally, the Quebec rate structure was somewhat less progressive
than the federal structure, featuring marginal rates of 17%, 21.25%, and 24.5% on taxable
incomes of 0 - $26,000, $26,001 – $52,000, and $52,000+ in 2001, for example.

Beginning in 2001 provinces covered by the tax collection agreements are free to
levy tax as a function of federal taxable income rather than basic federal tax. This has
already led to significant differences in rate structure across the provinces, and
divergence from the federal structure. While six provinces kept the three-bracket
structure for 2001, New Brunswick followed the federal lead to create a new $100,000+
bracket. Alberta introduced a flat tax at a 10% rate. British Columbia introduced five
brackets, with the top one beginning at $85,000. Careful study would be needed to assess
how the progressivity of provincial taxes is changing relative to federal, and at this early
stage it is likely premature to try to forecast how the new provincial structures will settle
down. However, if Alberta’s move to a flat tax is any indicator, the trend may be towards
reduced progressivity, which should reduce human capital ETRs somewhat.
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Payroll Taxes
In 1998 employees and employers each paid Canada Pension Plan contributions at
a rate of 3.2 % on earnings, with a cap reached at maximum pensionable earnings of
$36,900. Employment insurance (EI) contributions were paid at a rate of 2.7 % by the
employee and 3.78 % by the employer, on earnings up to $39,000. For workers whose
earnings never exceed $36,900 the payroll rate structure is mildly progressive, since the
first $3,500 of earnings are not subject to CPP contributions. However, for middle and
high earners, the system is clearly regressive. This regressivity should offset the positive
effect of PIT progressivity on human capital ETRs to some extent.

Student Loan Plans

Both the provinces and the federal government help students to finance their
education by providing guaranteed student loans. The provinces are responsible for
administration. Attempting to take into account variations in provincial plans is beyond
the scope of this study. Here we have modelled the effects of the Canada and Ontario
Student Loan Plans (CSLP and OSLP). The results should be reasonably representative
for the country as whole since the federal and provincial governments instituted reforms
in 1995/96 to achieve a fairly high degree of standardization. (See e.g. Finnie and
Schwartz, 1996.)

The CSLP/ OSLP system allows students to take out loans up to a limit which
equals allowable educatio n expenses minus the student’s expected contribution. The
latter is calculated taking family resources and dependants (e.g. children of a single
parent) into account. Maximum loan amounts are $165 per week from the federal
government and about $110 per week from provincial governments, for a total of $9,350
over a 34 week school year. Importantly, interest is paid by the government sponsors of
the plan until six months after graduation. Beyond that point the loans must normally be
paid back within a period of 9½ years. Finnie (2001) finds that graduates, on average,
pay the loans back quite quickly. Statistics Canada’s National Graduate Survey (NGS)
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found that for 1995 first-degree university graduates (the latest cohort for which figures
are available) about 40% of debt had been repaid after two years (Finnie, 2001, Figure 4).

In recent years student loans have become controversial, for two reasons. First,
the default rate has been growing, and there have been concerns that defaulters are treated
too leniently. Second, there has been some alarm at reports of substantial accumulated
debts. A wide range of average amounts of debt have been reported in the media, with
differences depending on which students are included, whether the average is taken for
just those students in debt or for all students, and so on. According to the Department of
Finance (1998), for a typical graduate with student loans, debt loads following a four-year
post-secondary program averaged $13,000 in 1990-91, and could be expected to rise to
$25,000 in 1998-99. On the other hand, the NGS results show average debt of only
about $10,000 for 1990 grads with loans and $13,600 for 1995 grads. The incidence of
debt in the NGS was about 46% for both the 1990 and 1995 graduates. (See Finnie,
2001, Figure 1.)

In order to prevent students defaulting on their loans, prior to 1997 those who
could demonstrate financial hardship received up to 18 months of interest relief. In 1997
relief was extended to 30 months. The February 1998 budget extended the maximum
period of interest relief to 54 months. In order to qualify for full interest relief gross
earnings had to be less than $22,300 as of April 1998. 18 (Prior to this the cutoff had been
$20,460.) And in order to go from 30 to 54 months’ relief individuals had to qualify as
still being in financial hardship after their loans had been rescheduled to cover a 15 year
period. Finally, for those individuals who still remain in financial difficulties, the
government will reduce the loan principal if annual payments exceed, on average, 15 %
of income. Maximum assistance is limited to the lesser of $10,000 or 50% of the loan.

18

The budget also introduced partial interest relief on a sliding scale for those whose incomes exceeded the
threshold for full relief by a small amount.
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To qualify, five years must have passed since the completion of study and normal interest
relief must have been exhausted. 19

Together with the tax provisions discussed earlier, the CSLP changes in the 1998
budget substantially increased support for post-secondary students. The modified CSLP
can be viewed as a crude income contingent student loan plan. The expectation is that the
majority of students will pay off their loans in full, but very sizeable reductions in the
effective burden of student loans will be provided to a significant group with low
incomes.

IV. Effective Tax Rates on Undergraduate University Education in Canada
Data and Assumptions

In order to gauge the typical size of ETR's in Canada we compute representative
values of the net- and gross-of-tax rates of return, rn and rg . To do this we use Statistics
Canada's 1995 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) to model actual and potential
earnings, Et and E t∗ , before- and after-tax. From this dataset we took median earnings
(and other quantiles) of full- time male and female workers conditioned on the highest
completed level of schooling being high school or a bachelor's degree, as the basis for E t∗
and Et respectively.

20

We have used median rather than mean earnings since we wish to

investigate rates of return and ETRs for an “average” student. Since earnings are
positively skewed the mean is above the median and is not representative for the typical
student.
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The February 1998 budget also announced a billion dollar Millenium Scholarship Fund, which may
reduce the need for student loans somewhat. Finally, in view of the provisions to assist repayment, it was
ruled that student loans would survive bankruptcy for 10 years after the completion of studies.
20
We also examined individuals with “some post-secondary” education. This group includes those
obtaining a community college diploma, but also students who attend university for some time without
graduating. Due to difficulty in estimating costs and the fact that this group is not representative of
community college graduates we do not show results for this group.
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The estimation of Et , E t∗ , and their differential is clearly critical. This requires
specification of a counterfactual scenario. How much would the university graduate have
earned if he/she had stopped formal education after high school? Our counterfactual says
they would have received the median amount earned by high school graduates of the
same age and gender. Some authors have argued that university graduates have greater
ability and that an ability differential (typically 10 or 15%) therefore needs to be applied
to the earnings of high school graduates when forming the counterfactual. (See e.g.
Stager, 1994) We take a comparative advantage view, in which it is not necessarily clear
that the median university graduate would have earned more than the median high school
grad if his/her education had been terminated after high school. 21

An alternative to our approach would be to estimate standard human capital
earnings equations, and to form the counterfactual by reducing the value of the years of
schooling variable for university graduates. This approach would likely hold constant
several more variables that affect earnings than are controlled in our approach. (Note that
we do hold constant age, gender, and hours of work.) These additional variables could
include e.g. occupation, industry, region, union membership, marital status, and fertility.
While it would be interesting to compare the results of such an exercise with our own, for
the sake of forming a “best guess” at ETRs we prefer our approach. Holding these
additional variables constant may be inappropriately restrictive. High school and
university graduates differ in occupation, industry, region, and so on, in part because of
their different levels of education. In our approach we err in ascribing all of these
differences to the effects of education, but we believe that this error is likely less than if
none of these differences were attributed to education.

We have specified costs and tax features, as far as possible to be those prevailing
in the academic year 1997-98.22 In 1997-98 undergraduate Arts tuition (representative
for core university programs and likely for median graduates) averaged $3,253, and
21

Studies have shown that skill-levels among university graduates are not equivalent and that many have
ended up taking jobs which were predominantly held by high school graduates previously. (See, e.g. Pryor
and Schaffer, 1997) Therefore, to assume a positive ability differential could be somewhat misleading.
22
Our detailed assumptions, as well as references to data sources, are set out in the Appendix.
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additional fees $342, according to Statistics Canada. Other direct expenses (books,
supplies, and return transportation to the educational institution) were assumed to be
$1,000 per year. Thus we estimate total direct expenses to have averaged $4,595.

In addition to distinguishing between men and women, the calculations we report
below consider part-time and full-time students separately. Full-time students are
assumed to work the equivalent of four months per year, during which they would earn
the same amount as a high school graduate. As in previous studies we reduce these
earnings somewhat (by 20%) to allow for unemployment and job search. 23 Part-time
students are assumed to earn their degrees in six years, as opposed to four for full- time
students. We assume that they work year-round - - part-time during the winter months
and full-time during the summer. They are assumed to earn half as much as if they were
employed full-time year round.

In modelling the taxes paid by workers after graduation we have assumed that
they do not claim a credit for a dependant spouse, and in the main results ignore the tax
consequences of children. The incidence of dependant spouses has been declining
rapidly in recent years, and we expect will be very low over the lifetimes of recent
graduates. Ignoring the tax consequences of children leads to an overstatement of tax
burdens over the working lifetime, but only a small error in the calculation of the taxes
paid on the incremental earnings due to education, as we argued in the last section. We
do take the tax treatment of children into account when considering the situation of single
parents.

We make no allowance in our main results for deductions from income after
graduation. (Personal credits and credits for interest on student loans where appropriate
are taken into account.) The principal deduction that could potentially be modelled is that
for RRSP/RPP contributions. However, this would be misleading since our calculations
only consider earnings over the working lifetime. If we took the tax relief on RRSP/RPP
23

Morisette (1998, p. 32) reports that the unemployment rate for all men aged 17 to 24 in 1996 was 14.8%.
In addition, 5.3% had involuntary part-time employment, for a total of 20.1% who did not have full-time
employment.
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contributions into account we would have to also model the tax paid on withdrawals.
Ignoring both contributions and withdrawals should be approximately offsetting.
Deductions for RESP contributions are taken into account when we model the impact of
CESGs.

Results

Results from our base case are shown in Table 1. This case uses the 1998 tax
system (i.e. as modified by the 1998 federal bud get) and assumes a single student with no
dependants who finances his/her education without the help of a student loan or an RESP.
The estimated rates of return are lower than those found by Vaillancourt (1997) and
Stager (1994) using 1991 Census data. Whereas we find the net-of-tax private rate of
return was 7.9% for male full-time university students, and 12.6% for female,
Vaillancourt found figures of 12.3 and 16.1%. Stager obtained private rates of return of
13.8% for men and 17.6% for women. Aside from using more recent earnings data, and
incorporating the effects of higher tuition fees, our study differs from the two earlier
studies by using median rather than mean earnings, and by assuming retirement after age
60 rather than 64 (in order to reflect the move to earlier retirement). These differences
act to produce lower estimated rates of return. 24

A notable feature of these results is that, as in previous studies, the rate of return
is considerably higher for females than for males. The reason is that the earnings of
women with a university degree are much closer to those of their male counterparts than
is the case for workers with only high school. We also find somewhat lower rates of
return to part-time than to full-time study. This difference is due mainly to the delay by
two years of the earnings benefits of study for the part-timers (since they remain in school
that much longer).
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The use of medians tends to give lower estimated rates of return because the gap between median and
mean earnings rises, both absolutely and proportionally, over the lifetime. Thus our estimates of forgone
earnings are closer to those of Vaillancourt and Stager than our estimates of the earnings gain accruing over
the working lifetime.
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Table 1 shows a relatively small difference between gross and net private rates of
return for university graduates. The proportional difference is, of course, the effective tax
rate. At 19.3% and 11.9% for full-time male and female students respectively, the ETRs
indicate that, in the no-loan no-RESP case, human capital investment is not taxed as
heavily as physical capital. (Recall our earlier discussion of the McKenzie et al., 1998,
results.) The difference in ETRs for men and women reflects the impact of progressivity.
Male university graduates still earn more than women, and on their earnings increments
due to education are therefore taxed more heavily on average. ETRs for those who attend
part-time are lower because they spend more time working while going to school, leading
to a higher marginal tax rate (i.e. a higher implicit subsidy) on their forgone earnings.

Turning to Table 2 we see the effects not only of taxes, but also of subsidies to
universities. The second column shows, again, the gross-of-tax private rate of return,
which does not take subsidies into account. The first column figures in the direct costs of
university education which are funded by government and which do not enter the private
calculation. 25 An effective subsidy rate (ESR) can be calculated as the proportional
difference between these rates of return. We find that the subsidy rates obtained are
greater than the effective tax rates shown in Table 1 for all cases. We thus find a negative
net effective tax rate, ETR – ESR, as shown in the last column of the table. This would
imply that overall the public sector encourages human capital investment - - a conclusion
that is in line with the results of earlier studies and that will be strengthened by taking
into account student loans and other forms of special assistance to post-secondary
students analyzed below.

Next we take into account the impacts of student loan financing on private rates of
return and ETR's. An interest rate of 9% is assumed. As Table 3 shows, both gross and
25

In estimating direct costs one must keep in mind that part of universities' costs are incurred for graduate
education, research, and other non-instructional purposes. No estimates are available that separate these
functions from undergraduate education. Tenure-track university professors are typically expected to
devote 40 - 50% of their time to teaching, including graduate teaching. We think a reasonable guess is that
about 30% of operating costs are incurred for undergraduate education. Estimates are also not available for
capital costs (interest, depreciation etc.) on a national basis, but Stager (1994) estimates that capital costs
are about 60% of operating costs. On this basis we have a figure of 50% (≅ 1.6 X 30%) of operating costs
as an estimate of total direct costs of undergraduate university education.
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net private rates of return increase with the student loan amount. The reason for this
increase lies mainly in the fact that interest is not paid until graduation, providing a
subsidy that of course increases with the size of the loan. The net rate of return is more
strongly affected because the implicit subsidy is larger relative to after-tax than beforetax earnings. The result is that, even without interest deductibility, providing student
loans reduces the effective tax rate significantly. This reflects what we argued was the
leading case in our Result 4. For males the tax rate declines from 19.3% in the no loan
case to just 17.2% with $15,000 in loans. For females, the drop is even larger: from
11.9% to 8.3%.

Table 3 illustrates another interesting point. As we increase the loan amount up to
$15,000 there is a roughly linear decrease in the ETR. But, when the loan is raised to
$30,000 there is a larger decline in the ETR. In the female case, for example, the ETR
becomes negative, falling to –3.4%. The reason is that in Ontario a student with a
$30,000 loan would qualify for loan forgiveness on $2,000 of the principal. Once again,
the effect on the estimated rates of return is higher for the net- than for the gross-of-tax
return. In fact, the difference in these impacts is so large that we obtain a negative
effective ETR.

The single female parent case reported in Table 3 shows that family status may
significantly affect tax impacts on education in Canada. The gross rates of return for a
single female parent are taken to be the same as those for a woman without children, but
the net rates of return are lower since after-tax forgone earnings are enlarged by the child
care expense deduction. The result is that the ETR is higher for a single parent. Also
note that the ETR falls less rapidly as the student loan amount is increased than in the
case without dependants. This is because before- and after-tax forgone earnings are more
similar for the single parent, so that loan benefits do not differ greatly in relative
importance between gross vs. net of tax calculations.

The second last column of Table 3 shows the impact of student loans on the
expenditure side. The ESR rises quite strongly with the loan amount, increasing from

27

25.1% without loans to 29.6% with a $15,000 loan for males, and from 27.6% to 35.2%
for females. Putting the impacts on the ETRs and ESRs together, a $15,000 student loan
decreases the net effective tax rate, ETR – ESR, from – 5.8% to – 12.3% for males and
from – 15.6% to – 26.9% for females. At a rough guess, these numbers suggest that the
median ETR – ESR for all students may have been about – 9% for males and – 21% for
females in 1998. 26 For males and females together median ETR – ESR may then have
been around – 15%. This represents fairly significant encouragement of human capital
investment, especially when we bear in mind our earlier conclusion that the average
EMTR for physical capital in Canada likely totalled at least 30%.

Table 4 shows part-time results corresponding to the full- time case shown in
Table 3. In the part-time case we find that the size of loan has little impact on the ETR.
This is because part-timers pay interest on their student loans from the time they are taken
out, rather than benefiting from zero interest payments until six months after graduation
like full-time students.

Table 5 shows results for full-time university students with interest relief. In
order for individuals in our calculations to qualify for 18 or 30 months of interest relief it
is sufficient that their earnings should be 2/3 of median after graduation. Rates of return
are accordingly lower for this group than for the median achievers studied in Tables 1 –
3. We see that providing interest relief has relatively little impact on the calculated
effective tax rates. A similar outcome is found for part-time students (see Collins and
Davies, 2002).
Next we study the effects of Canada Education Savings Grants (CESG's). 27 As of
Jan. 1, 1998, Canada Education Saving Grants (CESGs) add 20% to RESP contributions
annually, up to a grant limit of $400 per child. Net-of-tax rates of return rise and
26

The discussion in the last section indicated that by 1998 it would be reasonable to expect about half of
graduates to have had student loans and the average amount to have been about $15,000. We take an
average of the ETRs for zero vs $15,000 debt.
27
We do not attempt to estimate the impact of RESP's per se on the ETR's since the effects vary greatly
across taxp ayers depending on their use of RESP's vs. other saving vehicles. Also, prior to the introduction
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effective tax rates decline. In the case of full- time male university students, for example,
Table 6 indicates that the ETR drops from 19.3% to 15.9% when parents make $650
annual contributions over a 15 year period. If ma ximum contributions ($2,000) are made,
the ETRs fall much further - - to just 7.9% for full- time males and – 2.3% for full-time
females. Effects for part-time students are also large. These results show that CESGs
may have a very powerful effect as they accrue over the coming years.
Table 7 replicates the Table 1 case (no student loans and no RESP’s), assuming
alternatively that the graduate earns at the 25th or the 75th percentile of the earnings
distribution, rather than at the median. 28 We see that for males there is a drop in rates of
return and the ETR of going to the 25th percentile case from the median; and there is an
increase in going to the 75th percentile. The net-of-tax rate of return varies from 5.4% for
the 25th percentile earner to 9.9% at the 75th percentile, compared with 7.9% for the
median male in Table 1. The ETR ranges from 10.9% to 24.1%, compared to 19.3% for
the median.
For women, rates of return are also lower at the 25th percentile than at the median.
The net-of-tax rate of return for full-time students is 8.5%, for example, vs. 12.6% at the
median. The ETR is also lower, at 7.0% vs. 11.9% in the base case. However, when we
move to the 75th percentile the rates of return rise less, proportionally, than for males,
reflecting a less skewed distribution of earnings (and therefore lower peak tax rates on
earning gains) among female graduates. The ETR rises only to 18.6% at the 75th
percentile, compared to 24.1% for males.

The Table 7 results indicate the impact of the graduated rates in the tax system.
Effective tax rates on human capital investment rise with the lifetime earnings of
graduates. Another way of putting this is that the net-of-tax rates of return on human
capital investment are depressed more for high earners.
of CESG's. RESP's were not very popular. Thus we believe the most important effect to study is that of
CESG's.
28
Our counterfactual remains that the university graduates would have earned the median amount if they
had finished their formal education after high school. It is possible that this exaggerates both rates of return
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In order to get a complete assessment of the incentive effect on human capital
formation one must of course deduct the ESR from the ETR. Looking back at Table 2 we
see that if the graduates at the 75th percentile had the same ESRs as median workers, the
ETR – ESR figures for males would be – 1.0% and 1.0% for full-time and part-time
students respectively. Those for females would be – 9.0% and – 5.7% for full-time and
part-time. However, the assumption that the ESRs at higher percentiles are the same as at
the median may be incorrect. The highest paid graduates are those in professional
programs like engineering and medicine, which in 1997-98 were still more heavily
subsidized than general arts and science programs. Vaillancourt (1997) finds that the
difference is sufficient that the net subsidy rates (i.e. ESR - ETR ) in 1990 were highest in
science, engineering and medicine and lowest in the humanities and social science. 29

Finally, we have generated results (not shown) corresponding to Tables 1, 3, and
4 for the tax system as it existed in 1997, that is prior to the major changes of the
February 1998 federal budget. We found that the difference in 1997 vs. 1998 results for
full-time students without student loans or RESPs were small. These differences come
from the fact that the education amount was just $150 per month in 1997 for full-timers
compared to $200 per month in 1998. After-tax rates of return were slightly lower, and
ETRs slightly higher, in 1997 for part-timers however, since they received no education
amount tax credit. A monthly credit of $60 was introduced for part-timers in the 1998
budget.

We also found that the effects of the interest credit on student loans introduced in
1998 are quite small. For loans of up to $10,000 net-of-tax rates of return are less than
0.1 % points lower under the 1997 system, and the difference in ETR's is correspondingly
small. Compared to the impacts of CESGs, the credit for interest on student loans has a
relatively weak effect.
and ETRs somewhat for those at the 75th percentile and has the opposite effect at the 25th percentile. For
this reason the results by income level may be less reliable than those at the median.
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V. Conclusion

We have argued that effective tax rates are a useful device for summing up the
effects of the tax system on the incentive to invest in human capital, and have illustrated
the approach for undergraduate university level education in Canada. Our analysis has
concentrated on two broad features of effective tax rates - - how high they are for the
median person, and how they vary across individuals.
We have found that there is a notable difference between the effective tax rate on
human capital coming from the tax system per se (the ETR) and the net effective tax rate,
which subtracts the effective subsidy rate (the ESR) on the expenditure side. For median
earners, ETRs on human capital are sizeable, although lower than effective marginal tax
rates for physical capital in Canada. This is true even in the wake of the federal budgets
of 1996, 1997 and 1998, which introduced a wide range of measures that reduced ETRs.
On the other hand, ETR - ESR at the median is about – 9% for males and – 21% for
females. While at higher income levels we find that the net effective tax rate may be
positive for males, overall it is clear that government provides more incentive on the
expenditure side for investment in university education than disincentive on the tax side.
Whether a net effective tax rate on human capital that average about –15% across
the sexes is appropriate is an interesting question. For this to be supported on efficiency
grounds it is likely that one would have to appeal to externality arguments. Students’
liquidity constraints could also help to justify the negative ETR – ESR, although the
potential importance of this factor is significantly eroded by Canada’s quite generous
system of student loans. In view of the substantial positive effective tax rates on physical
capital, there is certainly a possibility that, from an efficiency standpoint, as of the late
1990’s Canadian governments provided too much encouragement for university study.
Since tuition fees have risen quite significantly in the last four or five years, one must
caution, however, that if this was indeed a problem its correction may already have
occurred.
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The net subsidy rates implied by Vaillancourt's 1990 results for males are 17.6% in medicine, 10.6% in
engineering , 6.0% in natural science, 2.2% in social science and 0.6% in humanities. These figures
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We have also found that the taxation of human capital is far from uniform in
Canada. This raises the possibility of distortions in the supply of human capital, with too
much investment taking place in programs, or by individuals, with low ETRs, and too
little occurring where ETRs are high. We have found that ETRs differ depending on
income after graduation, full- time vs. part-time study, receipt of student loans, gender,
presence of dependants, and use of RESPs. For example, we found that ETRs for fulltime students who go on to earn at the 75th percentile of the earnings distribution
throughout their lifetimes are higher than for those earning at the 25th percentile. In view
of the strong association between earnings and area of university studies this may have
interesting implications for the composition of human capital investment. Other things
equal, the highest ETRs will be felt by graduates in areas such as business, engineering,
and medicine. At the opposite extreme are graduates in the humanities. We have seen
that in some of the high tax areas there has in the past been an offsetting effect in the
form of heavy dir ect subsidies. However, the tendency to allow tuition fees to rise in
recent years, especially in more specialized programs, may be eroding that offset.

It is possible that the provisions of the 1998 federal budget, and the doubling of
the education amount tax credit in 2001, may not only have reduced the tax-side
disincentive for human capital investment, but may also have reduced non- uniformity in
ETRs. Increases in the education amount have a broadly based impact that has lowered
ETRs for the majority of students. The special provisions for part-time students and those
with dependants reduce ETRs for people whose human capital investments were lessfavored by the tax system. And in the future, as higher income taxpayers take increasing
advantage of Canada Education Savings Grants (CESGs) they should see some reduction
in their ETRs.
While the analytical framework we have introduced can be applied to human
capital investment at any level, our numerical results have been confined to the case of
first-degree university graduates. It would be interesting to extend the results in order to

represent the difference between private and public rates of return in Panel B of Vaillancourt's Table 3, p. 6.
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compute ETRs on completed high school, community college, incomplete college and
university studies, post- graduate work and on-the-job training (OJT). We expect that
effective tax rates are lower for high school completion, community college, and
incomplete post-secondary studies than for undergraduate university degrees. This result
is likely in view of the importance of income level in determining ETRs. Results for
post-graduates are harder to anticipate since rates of return to graduate study are much
lower than for undergraduate programs, and ETRs could be very sensitive to small
absolute differences in gross and net rates of return.

Attention to the ETR on OJT would be valuable since it is clear that a large
element of human capital is formed on the job. There is good reason to expect much
lower ETRs than for formal schooling. In general firms and workers share the costs of
such training. Workers do so by receiving lower wages or salaries during training. But
progressivity effects are likely to be much less serious than for formal schooling, since it
is only a portion of earnings that is being given up and the tax rate on foregone earnings
may not be much less than that on the earnings increments due to training. On the
employer’s part, at least for corporations the tax rate is constant, so that there is no
progressivity effect at all. Hence ETRs for OJT, like effective subsidy rates, may be quite
small.
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Appendix
A.1 Basic Data
1) Our estimates of tuition and additional expenses are based on Statistics Canada
data for 1997-8. See http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/970825/d970825.htm#art2. An
average was taken over arts degrees across the country.
2) Data on “other expenses” were taken from a variety of sources- Statistics
Canada databases, university web sites, and university calendars. “Other
expenses” refers to items that are only required for schooling (e.g. books and
supplies for schooling).
3) The earnings data come from Statistics Canada’s 1995 Survey of Consumer
Finance microdata tape.
A.2 Assumptions on Earnings
1) Part-time earnings for full-time students are assumed to be summer earnings
and therefore comprise a maximum of four months of earnings potential. To
account for unemployment and job search the value is reduced by 20%.
2) We assume that part-time students work part-time during the regular school
year and full- time in the summer. This motivates the further assumption that their
annual earnings are half of full- time earnings. A part-time student is assumed to
take, on average, 3.3 courses a year. This assumption allows for a part-time
student to get a four-year degree in approximately six years. Taking more than
three courses in a normal school year would qualify a person as full- time.
Therefore, it is assumed that a part-time individual works, as mentioned, year
round and goes to school year round. He/she takes 2.5 courses during the school
year and 1 during the summer, accordingly, to finish his/her degree (requiring 20
credits in a 5 credit/year school).

A.3 Public Rates of Return
1) Data on government spending and enrollment for male and female, full- time
and part-time students were obtained from the Statistics Canada website. The
most recent data available at this site were expenditure values on education and
enrollment figures for 1995-96. It is these figures that are used to calculate the
public rate of return.
2) Current and capital expenditures on undergraduate instruction are assumed to
to equal one half of operating expenditures. The justification for this assumption
is given in the text of the paper.
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3) Public expenditures per student are calculated as in Vaillancourt (1995).
Operating expenditure on universities is divided by full-time equivalent (FTE)
enrollment, where a part-time student counts as one third of a full-time student.
4) Public expenditures per part-time student are assumed to be one third of those
for full- time students, in line with point 3.

A.4 Tax Features
A.4.i) Tax Credits
In addition to basic personal amounts, students are eligible for non-refundable
credits on tuition and certain additional fees. They may also be eligible for nonrefundable credits in the form of the education amount, and on interest paid on
student loans. As outlined in the paper, the education amount was $150 per
month in 1997 and $200 per month in 1998 for full-time students. Part-time
students did not receive the education amount in 1997, but could claim $60 per
month in 1998. The taxpayer earns a net credit applicable to federal tax equal to
17% of the amount claimed, and there is a further credit against provincial tax.
We assume that the sum of the two equals 25%, as it did in Ontario in 1998.

A.4.ii) Child Care Expense Deduction (CCED)
1) In 1998, the government allowed taxpayers to deduct from taxable income
child care expenses of up to $7,000 for each eligible child under seven years of
age. A deduction of up to $4,000 was allowed for children aged 7 to 16.
2) For full- time students we assume that child care expenses equal $4200 ($350 *
12 months), and that these expenses only last until the child is seven years old.
We assume that the child is one year old when the parent is 19. Therefore, child
care expenses are only deducted up until the age of 25.
3) Most part-time students were not eligible to claim CCED prior to the 1998
budget. The latter allowed part-time students to deduct up to $2200. We assume
that a part-time student with a dependant would be at this maximum.

A.4.iii) Registered Education Savings Plans (RESPs) and Canada
Education Savings Grants (CESG's)
1) In both 1997 and 1998 the federal government allowed taxpayers to contribute
up to $4,000 per child to an RESP.
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2) Since January 1, 1998 the federal government has been providing a CESG,
equal to 20% of the first $2,000 of RESP contributions per child. We assume
alternative RESP contribution values of $650/year and $2000+/year in calculating
the amount of CESG awarded.
3) The calculation for the CESG amount is based on an example in the 1998
Budget documents, which assumed a 5% rate of return and a contribution rate of
$650/year. For a contribution rate of $2000/year the CESG amount increases
proportionally.

A.5 Canada Student Loan Plan
A.5.i) Basic CSLP Repayment Features
1) Students have a choice upon consolidating their Canada Student Loans. They
can either choose a maximum fixed interest rate equal to the bank’s prevailing
unsecured consumer loan rate, which cannot exceed prime plus 5%, or a
maximum floating interest rate of prime plus 2.5%. For Ontario Student
Assistance Program (OSAP) loans students pay an interest rate of prime plus 1%.
2) Data on interest rates were taken from the Globe and Mail web site
(http://www.globeandmail.ca) on Tuesday, June 30th , 1998. The Canadian prime
interest rate on this date was equal to 6.50%. Being dependent upon the loan held,
the interest rate that a student actually faces may vary significantly. For example,
using a prime interest rate 6.5% would result in an interest rate of anywhere
between 7.5-11.5%, which would have a dramatic effect on the type of repayment
plan chosen. For the purposes of this study a middle rate of 9% is used.
3) Information on CSL and OSAP loans was taken from the follo wing web sites:
CSL - (http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/student_loans/), OSAP - (http://osap.gov.on.ca).
4) The regulations on loan forgiveness under OSAP were taken from the above
Government of Ontario address. As of 1997-8, loan forgiveness was only
available on loans that exceeded $7,000 for two terms of study; two terms being
defined as 21-40 weeks of schooling (i.e. any amount of loan exceeding $7000 for
one eight- month school year was forgiven). For our purposes loan forgiveness
only figures into the $30,000 loan case, as it is assumed that the loan is broken
into four equal parts to coincide with the four years of full- time study. Thus,
$7500/year is being borrowed of which $500 is forgiven each year. It should also
be noted that part of the loan is forgiven only after the loan(s) is (are) consolidated
(meaning that a payment schedule has been agreed upon and signed at a bank).
For example, upon graduation $2,000 of the $30,000 loan will be forgiven and
interest payments will be calculated therefore on the remaining $28,000, not the
entire $30,000. Part-time students receive no loan forgiveness, as they do not
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qualify for OSAP loans; one must have at least a 60% course load (i.e. 3 out of a
maximum of 5 courses) to be eligible for such loans.
5) Net-of-tax and gross-of-tax private benefits/costs are calculated taking into
account that accruing interest is paid for by government during full-time studies.
If individuals are studying part-time they do not benefit from having the interest
that accrues on their loan paid off by the government. Part-time individuals must
pay the interest on their loan from the moment it is acquired.
6) A part-time student is assumed to be working (approx. 20 hrs/week). Therefore,
it is assumed that he/she will not accumulate as much debt as someone who is not
working. Thus a part-time person only faces loan amounts that range from $2500$15000 in our calculations.

A.5.ii) Interest Relief under CSLP
1) For individuals to be able to qualify for interest relief a reduction in median
earnings is necessary. For the purposes of this study we use two thirds of median
earnings to ensure that individuals fit the specified criteria set forth in the 1998
Budget. As of April 1998, full-time students are able to benefit from full interest
relief provided their gross earnings are less than $22,300 (prior to this change the
value was $20,460).
2) As recently as 1996 interest relief was only available for up to 18 months, but
this was changed in 1997 with an extension of the period to 30 months. Once
again in 1998 this period has been extended; it is now a maximum of 54 months,
although the extension only includes those who are in dire straits financially. To
qualify for the extended 54- month period an individual must have exhausted the
30 months of interest relief and still be in financial hardship once the repayment
period is extended to 15 years. All of this must take place during the first five
years upon leaving school.
3) For those in the most difficulty, the federal government introduced debt
reduction in 1998. Upon exhausting all relief and having five years pass since the
completion of schooling, if an individual is still in financial hardship he/she can
have his/her loan principal reduced if annual payments exceed, on average, 15%
of his/her income.
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Table 1
Rates of Return and Effective Tax Rates for First University Degree Graduates:
1998 Tax System, No Student Loans, No Dependants (Base Case)
IRR (%)
Net-of-Tax (1)

IRR (%)
Gross-of-Tax (2)

ETR
[(2) - (1)] / (2)

Males
Full-Time
Part-Time

7.94
7.06

9.84
9.00

0.193
0.215

Females
Full-Time
Part-Time

12.63
11.52

14.34
13.29

0.119
0.133

Notes: IRR = internal rate of return
ETR = effective tax rate
Source: Authors’ calculations using 1995 Statistics Canada Survey of Consumer Finance data.

Table 2
Base Case Rates of Return, Effective Subsidy Rates, and Tax Minus Subsidy Rate
IRR (%)
Public (1)

IRR (%)
Gross-of-Tax
Private (2)

ESR
[(2) – (1)]/(2)

ETR – ESR

Males
Full-Time
Part-Time
Females
Full-Time
Part-Time

7.37
6.86

9.84
9.00

0.251
0.238

-0.058
-0.023

10.39
9.85

14.34
13.29

0.276
0.259

-0.157
-0.126

Notes: Definition of base case is as in Table 1.
ESR = effective subsidy rate
ETR, IRR – see Table 1.
Source: See Table 1.
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Table

3

Rates of Return and Effective Tax Rates for Full-Time Students, 1998 Tax System
With Student Loans
Sex and
Dependants

Value of
Loan ($)

IRR (%)
Net-of-Tax (1)

Male,
No Dependants

0 (base case)
5000
10000
15000
30000

7.94
8.15
8.39
8.66
10.31

Female,
No Dependants

0
5000
10000
15000
30000

Female,
Single Parent
With one child

0
5000
10000
15000
30000

IRR (%)
Gross-of-Tax (2)

ETR
[(2) - (1)] / (2)

ESR*

9.84
10.03
10.24
10.46
11.77

0.193
0.187
0.180
0.172
0.124

0.251
0.265
0.280
0.296
0.374

-0.058
-0.078
-0.100
-0.124
-0.250

12.63
13.20
13.88
14.70
20.49

14.34
14.83
15.38
16.03
19.81

0.119
0.110
0.098
0.083
-0.034

0.276
0.299
0.324
0.352
0.475

-0.157
-0.189
-0.226
-0.269
-0.509

11.59
12.04
12.56
13.16
16.99

14.34
14.83
15.38
16.03
19.81

0.192
0.188
0.184
0.179
0.142

0.276
0.299
0.324
0.352
0.475

-0.084
-0.111
-0.140
-0.173
-0.333

Notes: 1) The zero loan case without dependants is the same as the base case considered in
Tables 1 and 2.
2) The female single parent is assumed to have had a child at age 18. This child will
generate a child care expense deduction until the parent is aged 25. Canada Study
Grants, which were offered starting in 1999, are not included.
3) For the $30,000 loan, $2,000 of the principal qualifies for loan forgiveness. See
appendix.
4) * ESR = [(2) - (appropriate entry from col. 1 of Table 2)]/(2)
Source: See Table 1.

ETR - ESR
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Table 4
Rates of Return and Effective Tax Rates for Part -Time Students, 1998 Tax System
With Student Loans
Sex and
Dependants

Value of
Loan ($)

IRR (%)
Net-of-Tax (1)

IRR (%)
Gross-of-Tax (2)

ETR
[(2) - (1)] / (2)

ESR*

Male,
No Dependants

0
5000
10000
15000

7.06
7.02
6.97
6.92

9.00
8.98
8.95
8.92

0.215
0.218
0.221
0.224

0.238
0.236
0.233
0.231

-0.023
-0.018
-0.012
-0.007

Female,
No Dependants

0
5000
10000
15000

11.52
11.58
11.63
11.70

13.29
13.35
13.42
13.49

0.133
0.133
0.133
0.133

0.259
0.262
0.266
0.270

-0.126
-0.129
-0.133
-0.137

Female,
Single Parent
With one child

0
5000
10000
15000

11.17
11.21
11.25
11.30

13.29
13.35
13.42
13.49

0.159
0.160
0.161
0.162

0.259
0.262
0.266
0.270

-0.100
-0.102
-0.105
-0.108

Notes: 1) The zero loan case without dependants is the same as the base case considered in
Tables 1 and 2.
2) The female single parent is assumed to have had a child at age 18. This child will
generate a child care expense deduction until the parent is aged 25. The amount
claimed during study is subject to the restrictions imposed in the 1998 federal budget.
(See appendix.) Canada Study Grants, which will be offered starting in 1999, are not
included.
3) * ESR = [(2) - Appropriate entry from col. 1 of Table 2]/(2)

Source: See Table 1.

ETR - ESR

43

Table 5
Rates of Return and Effective Tax Rates for Full-Time Students, 1998 Tax System
With $10,000 Student Loan and Interest Relief
Sex and
Dependants

Interest Relief
(months)

Male,
No Dependants

IRR (%)
Net-of-Tax (1)

IRR (%)
Gross-of-Tax (2)

ETR
[(2) - (1)] / (2)

0

6.54

7.45

0.122

18

6.66

7.55

0.118

30

6.72

7.60

0.116

0

10.86

11.37

0.045

18

11.04

11.51

0.041

30

11.14

11.59

0.039

Single Parent

0

10.06

11.37

0.115

With one child

18

10.18

11.51

0.116

30

10.24

11.59

0.116

Female,
No Dependants

Female,

Notes: 1) Assumptions on the female single parent are as in Table 3.
2) Earnings equal 2/3 of median.
Source: See Table 1.
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Table 6
Rates of Return and Effective Tax Rates with CESGs,
1998 Tax System, No Student Loans, No Dependants
Sex

Yearly
Contribution ($)

IRR (%)
Net-of-Tax (1)

IRR (%)
Gross-of-Tax (2)

ETR
[(2) - (1)] / (2)

ESR*

ETR - ESR

Male
Full-Time
Part-Time

650
650

8.27
7.34

9.84
9.00

0.159
0.184

0.251
0.238

-0.092
-0.054

Female
Full-Time
Part-Time

650
650

13.22
12.01

14.34
13.29

0.078
0.096

0.276
0.259

-0.198
-0.163

Male
Full-Time
Part-Time

2000
2000

9.06
7.98

9.84
9.00

0.079
0.114

0.251
0.238

-0.172
-0.124

Female
Full-Time
Part-Time

2000
2000

14.67
13.18

14.34
13.29

-0.023
0.008

0.276
0.259

-0.299
-0.251

Notes: 1) CESG = Canada Educational Study Grant. CESG benefits incorporated here are
based on an example provided by Department of Finance (1998, p. 35). Contributions
are made over a 15 year period and earn a 5 % rate of return.
2) * ESR = [(2) - Appropriate entry from col. 1 of Table 2]/(2)

Source: See Table 1.
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Table 7
Rates of Return and Effective Tax Rates for 25th and 75th Quantiles:
1998 Tax System, No Student Loans, No Dependants
Sex

Quantile

IRR (%)
Net-of-Tax (1)

IRR (%)
Gross-of-Tax (2)

ETR
[(2) - (1)] / (2)

Male
Full-Time
Part-Time

25th
25th

5.35
4.29

6.00
4.92

0.109
0.129

Female
Full-Time
Part-Time

25th
25th

8.46
8.69

9.09
9.49

0.070
0.081

Male
Full-Time
Part-Time

75th
75th

9.88
9.16

13.02
12.19

0.241
0.248

Female
Full-Time
Part-Time

75th
75th

12.42
12.95

15.25
16.22

0.186
0.202

Source: See Table 1.

